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7.1  Introduction 
The years since 1974 have been very difficult ones for the steel indus- 
tries of the United States and the European Community (EC). Produc- 
tion in both regions has dropped by more than one-third and employment 
has fallen even more. In recent years there have been either large losses 
or small profits.' Data on these trends are presented in table 7.1. In re- 
sponse to these developments the U.S. government and the Commis- 
sion of the European Community have adopted rather similar external 
policy measures but quite different domestic measures. How well are 
these measures suited to meet the problems affecting the industry and 
how might they be modified to deal more effectively with these problems? 
In order to answer these questions, the fundamental causes of  the 
industry's problems are discussed in section 7.2. The policy responses 
and their effects in the U.S. and EC are described in section 7.3. The 
last section of the paper evaluates these policy responses. 
7.2  The Causes of the Crisis 
7.2.1 
In the past 30 years there has been a dramatic shift in the pattern of 
steel production, exports, and imports around the world.  The basic 
New Entrants in the International Steel Market 
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173 Table 7.1  Steel Production, Capacity, and Labor Employed in the U.S., EC, and Member Countries 
~~ 
Crude Steel Production  Capacity (crude)  Employment 
(thousands of metric tons)  (thousands of metric tons) 
1974  1977  1980  1984  1974  1977  1980  I984  1974  1977  1980  1984 

















































































































































Sources: International Iron and Steel Institute, Annual Slutistical  Reporf, various years for production data; Eurostat, Iron and Sfeel Yeurhook, 
various years, for EC capacity and employment data; and American Iron and Steel Institute, Annud Statistical  Report, various years for U.S. 
capacity and employment figures. 175  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
trends are summarized in table 7.2. In 1950, the United States produced 
almost half of the world’s steel output; by 1984, its share was less than 
12 percent of this output. The U.S. became a net importer of steel in 
1959 and has imported over 20 percent of its steel throughout most of 
the 1980s. The European Community tripled its steel production be- 
tween 1950 and 1970. Its output has been reduced from the peak of the 
early 1970s, but the EC remains a net exporter of steel products. Japan 
emerged as a major player in the international steel market during the 
1960s and early 1970s, with an increase in production of over 100 million 
tons between 1960 and 1973 (the peak year for Japanese production). 
In fact, Japan’s increased production capability is underestimated by 
the production figures because Japan is estimated to have been oper- 
ating at only about 65 percent of capacity during the last decade (Brad- 
ford 1986, 82). As will be shown in the next section, in the last 10 to 
15  years some developing nations, especially Brazil and Korea, have 
also emerged to become important players in  the international  steel 
market. 
7.2.2  Decline in Demand 
In the past  12  years, growth in overall demand for steel has been 
extremely sluggish; it can essentially  be characterized as a period of 
zero growth. In  1973-74  steel production peaked in the noncentrally 
planned economies at about 519 million metric tons. After a recession 
in  1975, steel demand began to recover until it reached its 1973 level 
in  1979-80.  Since 1980, however, steel production has remained at or 
below 500 million metric tons in the noncentrally  planned economies 
with 1982 and 1983 being especially disastrous years for steel demand. 
The broad trends are summarized in table 7.3. 
The years 1973-74  were very encouraging ones for the future of the 
world  steel industry. Most forecasters of steel demand predicted sig- 
nificant growth in steel demand over the 1975-85  period.*  As a result, 
a number of nations undertook major expansion projects for their steel 
industries. By  the early  1980s,  however, the optimism  of  1974 had 
turned to pessimism as many companies, especially those in the U.S. 
and the EC, experienced significant losses. 
Overall trends mask an even more ominous trend as  far as  the United 
States, the EC, and other industrialized countries (ICs) are concerned. 
From 1973 to 1984 there was a significant decline in steel consumption 
in  the industrialized  countries, from 416 to 322  million  metric tons, 
while consumption in the developing countries (DCs) increased from 
100 to 181  million metric tons, a total of  81  percent. Over this period 
demand in the United States fell by 36 million metric tons (crude steel 
equivalent) to 113 million  tons and by  33 million  metric tons (crude 
steel equivalent) in the EC to 95 million tons. Thus, while steel demand Table 7.2  The Changing International Positions of the U.S.,  EC, and Japanese Steel Industries 
United States  European Community  Japan  World 
Percent of  Neth  Percent of  Netb  Percent of  Neth 






























-  6.3 
-  12.4 




















































Source: Adam  and Mueller (1986). 
"In million net (or short) tons of raw steel. 
hExports minus imports, in million net tons of  steel products. (One product ton is roughly equivalent to 1.25 tons of  raw steel.) 177  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
Table 7.3  World Steel Production Trends 
Levels (millions of metric tons of 
crude steel equivalent) 
Growth 
(% per annum) 
1960  1973  1980  1982  1984  1960-73  1973-80  1980-84 
ICS  233  463  407  338  376  5.4  -  1.8  -  2.0 
DCsa  -  20  -  57  -  94  -  97  113  8.4 
Subtotal  253  520  501  435  489  5.7 
7.4  4.7 
-0.5  -0.6 
CPEs  -  87179215210221  5.7  2.7  0.7 
Total  340  699  716  645  710  5.7  0.3  0.0 
Source: Compiled from data available in International Iron and Steel Institute,  Annual Statistical 
Report, various issues. 
“China is included in the DCs. 
in  the  developing  world  has  been  increasing, the opposite  trend  is 
apparent for the industrialized world. These trends are summarized in 
table 7.4. 
Most forecasts of demand for the 1985-95 decade predict continued 
slow aggregate growth of about 1 percent annually for the noncentrally 
planned economies. Again, however, there is a sharp contrast in the 
expected growth patterns  of  the industrialized  countries and the de- 
veloping world. For the next decade, the International Iron and Steel 
Institute (IISI) forecasts annual growth of 0.1 percent in the industrial- 
ized countries, but 3 percent in the developing countries. 
The growth of  steel demand in the developing world and not in the 
industrialized countries  is explained by  the IISI’s intensity-of-steel- 
demand curve. The curve is based on data that this organization has 
collected showing that per capita consumption of  steel increases (at a 
decreasing rate) with national per capita income up to a maximum and 
then begins to de~line.~  There are a number of  reasons why the steel 
intensity curve has the observed shape. First, infrastructure expendi- 
Table 7.4  World Steel Consumption Trends 
Growth 
(% per annum) 
Levels (millions of metric tons of 
crude steel equivalent) 
1960  1973  1980  1982  1984  1960-73  1973-80  1980-84 
ICS  218  427  360  298  339  5.3  -  2.4  -  1.5 
DCs”  -  39  -  87147144163  6.4  7.8  2.6 
Subtotal  257  514  507  442  502  5.5  -0.2  -0.2 
CPEs  -  89181214209218  5.6  0.0  0.5 
Total  346  695  721  651  720  5.5  0.5  0.0 
Source: Same as Table 7.3 except for 1960 data, which are taken from the World Bank data 
base. 178  David G.  Tarr 
tures tend to be significantly reduced after a given level of development 
is reached. Second, the share of service industries has been rising in 
most Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries  since 1974; As economies shift into banking, financial ser- 
vices, and insurance, and away from traditional smokestack industries, 
there is a decline in the demand for steel. Third, there is a saturation 
level for some consumer durables, such as refrigerators; once reached, 
this results in slower growth. A fourth reason is that manufacturers of 
products such as automobiles and cans have  substituted  alternative 
materials, and fifth, technological advances have reduced the demand 
for steel. For example, it is estimated by IISI that continuous casting 
reduces the demand for raw  steel by  15 percent. In the decade from 
1974 to 1984, the industrialized countries’ production of steel by con- 
tinuous casting went from 15 percent to 64 percent, while that of the 
developing nations went from 15 percent to 36 percent. Also, the de- 
velopment of stronger, thinner gauge steel has reduced the demand for 
final steel  product^.^ 
Table 7.5  Unit Cost for Inputs: U.S. and Japan (dollars per metric ton of steel 
produced) 
Total  Labor 






















294.65  161.93 
270.27  159.26 
215.55  147.30 
161.21  100.97 
155.11  83.56 
145.98  81.28 
137.23  78.05 
125.25  69.93 
119.40  67.78 
117.70  69.53 
113.21  71.86 
112.99  76.38 
114.97  75.20 
116.01  79.03 
118.74  81.56 
122.50  91.59 
120.18  85.08 
113.98  90.04 
122.18  98.65 
110.00  133.21 
110.84  119.83 
U.S  Japan 
143.55  49.64 
132.87  49.93 
100.91  42.60 
87.31  35.32 
89.52  31.97 
85.03  27.98 
80.81  23.22 
75.18  21.20 
70.35  20.83 
69.88  19.93 
65.93  20.68 
65.06  22.11 
67.00  20.97 
69.62  23.76 
71.36  24.10 
72.36  21.94 
71.83  23.01 
66.67  25.02 
70.09  30.12 
60.24  26.79 
54.67  26.66 
Iron ore 
U.S.  Japan 
44.51  26.87 
37.58  27.85 
29.66  21.65 
24.42  17.62 
23.84  16.97 
22.85  19.43 
21.54  17.47 
20.34  16.66 
20.65  16.99 
20.10  16.68 
19.95  18.14 
19.92  18.63 
20.41  16.73 
19.60  17.80 
19.93  18.97 
20.58  18.54 
19.47  17.91 
17.25  18.08 
19.75  21.20 
18.17  31.55 
17.51  25.78 
Scrap 
U.S.  Japan 
Coking coal 
U.S.  Japan 
21.82  22.72 
18.98  17.23 
34.10  33.65 
17.08  23.38 
11.26  12.04 
8.53  9.06 
10.05  16.05 
8.60  14.00 
6.71  12.16 
6.73  15.73 
7.72  14.88 
8.56  16.75 
8.25  19.27 
7.39  18.12 
6.83  17.43 
9.45  30.09 
8.24  23.16 
10.87  24.59 
9.94  19.37 
10.95  37.98 
17.78  35.15 
53.73  41.38 
52.40  43.18 
29.20  29.84 
17.44  15.18 
16.08  14.65 
15.15  16.76 
12.80  14.65 
10.29  11.72 
10.69  10.91 
10.83  10.27 
9.99  10.84 
9.78  10.94 
9.74  10.05 
9.16  10.99 
10.17  12.33 
10.21  11.85 
11.48  11.50 
10.93  13.03 
13.09  16.75 
12.73  23.03 
12.15  20.01 
Source: Federal Trade Commission Staff Report (1977, pp.  113-14). 179  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
Change in Relative Costs 
Emergence of  Japan and the Developing Countries 
In a study that has come to be known as the Federal Trade Com- 
mission Staff Steel Report (1977), my colleagues and I investigated the 
causes of the changing patterns of  steel trade flows over the period 
1956-76.  We  concluded that the changing production pattern was pri- 
marily explained by changes in relative costs. Incorporated in table 7.5 
is the summary table from the study, reporting the changes in variable 
steel costs between the United States and Japan. U.S. costs relative 
to Japan’s went from being slightly lower at the beginning of the period 
to over $100 per ton greater than Japan’s at the end of  the period. 
Whereas Japan was considered to be the low-cost producer of steel in 
the  world  in  the  mid-1970s, the Republic  of  Korea (Korea) is now 
considered to enjoy that position. The data of table 7.6 reveal that as 
of  1984, Korea enjoyed a cost advantage of  about $166 per ton over 
the U.S. and $77 per ton over the EC. While the table exaggerates the 
Table 7.5  (continued) 
Fuel oil  Electric power  Noncoking Coal  Natural gas 






















5.05  6.84  15.84  14.47  0.85  0.00 
4.95  8.66  14.03  12.41  0.85  0.00 
5.02  9.01  10.21  10.54  0.76  0.00 
1.91  3.43  8.09  6.04  0.54  0.00 
I .60  2.47  7.60  5.45  0.54  0.00 
I .54  2.73  7.70  5.31  0.62  0.00 
I .23  1.81  6.49  4.74  0.56  0.11 
0.94  1.44  5.83  4.80  0.51  0.10 
I .09  I .74  5.74  5.02  0.61  0.10 
I .05  1.87  5.30  4.92  0.63  0.13 
1.14  1.75  4.90  5.33  0.63  0.24 
I .28  1.93  4.64  5.70  0.63  0.31 
1.41  1.92  4.48  5.88  0.63  0.37 
1.58  2.04  4.73  5.87  0.73  0.45 
1.59  I .92  4.71  6.28  0.83  0.54 
1.74  2.04  4.27  6.50  0.89  0.63 
1.80  2.30  3.92  6.44  0.85  0.75 
1.78  2.09  3.47  6.61  0.80  0.61 
1.99  2.54  3.96  6.72  1.07  1.94 
I .97  4.27  3.73  6.29  0.75  3.31 
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Table 7.6  An International Comparison of Major Input Costs, 1984 
(in dollars per net ton shipped) 
Difference 
Coal &  from U.S. 
Labor  Ore  Energy  Capital  Total  cost 
U.S.  I70  102  76  55  403  0 
EC  97  102  48  67  314  -  89 
Japan  82  97  46  77  302  -  101 
Brazil  44  86  50  114  296  -  126 
South Korea  24  97  48  85  256  -  166 
Source: Adarns and Mueller (1986, 107). 
Note: Product mix of steel output, i.e., the proportion of high and low value steel products 
is similar for the steel industries of the U.S., the European Community, and Japan. The 
steel industries of Brazil and South Korea produce a higher proportion of  less sophis- 
ticated products, which causes the differential between their cost and that of the U.S. 
industry to be overstated by $15 to $25 per net ton shipped. 
cost advantage enjoyed by  Brazil  and Korea by  about $20 per ton 
because these two countries produce a product mix that is somewhat 
less finished than that of the other countries, the data suggest that at 
least these particular countries are not simply building “monuments.” 
Rather, the technology of steel is no longer progressing rapidly and, 
therefore, in a world offree trade, production might well shift, gradually 
and in the long run, toward the developing world.5 
Raw Materials and Transportation Costs. 
When one examines the data on the cost estimates in the tables, it 
is apparent that the main explanation of the cost differences is the 
difference in labor costs. Raw material costs are not a major factor in 
the overall comparisons, although they can make a difference in the 
case of particular plants. 
Steel and the raw materials used in making steel are relatively heavy 
products for their value. Transportation costs can loom large in total 
value if  it is necessary to ship large distances by rail or truck. Having 
deepwater ports, with the resulting access to other’s raw materials and 
the ability to ship their output at relatively low transportation charges, 
is an advantage enjoyed by Japan, Korea, and some other countries 
that compensates for their lack of domestic raw materials. 
Access to low-cost water transport should be borne in mind in ob- 
serving the pattern of closures among U.S. steel plants as well as in 
considering what to expect from a market-oriented closure pattern in 
the EC. Plants located on the Great Lakes with access to Mesabi range 
iron ore via  water transportation (and the high-quality  Appalachian 
coking coal) and proximity to the markets of Cleveland, Detroit, and 181  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
Chicago, are in relatively good condition. The inland plants in places 
like Pennsylvania and Ohio, however, will find it very difficult to survive.“ 
Labor Costs 
The increase in the relative labor costs of the U.S. is the result of a 
combination of two factors: improved relative productivity of its com- 
petitors and an increase in its labor-compensation costs. To  a lesser 
extent, these factors have also been important for the EC. In the mid- 
1960s, an average U.S. steelworker produced roughly twice as much 
steel per hour as his Japanese, German, French, or British counterpart 
(with the German worker producing slightly more than the other three). 
By  1982, if the output per U.S.  worker is indexed at 100, the Japanese 
worker’s productivity is at 141, the German worker’s at 108, the French 
worker’s at 100, and the British worker’s at 71.7  Data underlying table 
7.6 suggest that the productivity of  Korean workers is comparable to 
that of British workers (Adams and Mueller 1986, 107). Thus, the U.S. 
no longer has a significant productivity advantage, and the Japanese 
have surpassed both the U.S. and the EC. 
Steelworkers  around  the  world  typically  earn wages  above those 
earned by the average manufacturing worker in their country. During 
the  1960s and early  1970s hourly  labor costs had  been  less than 50 
percent above the average for U.S.  manufacturing workers. During the 
late  1970s, however, they soared to the point where, by  1982, U.S. 
steelworkers were earning 93 percent more than the U.S.  average.8 In 
Europe, steelworkers’ premium over other manufacturing workers is 
much lower-between  7 and 32 percent. Only in Japan do steelworkers 
earn a premium  comparable to that  earned in  the U.S.,  a premium 
which, in the Japanese case, appears to be productivity-based. These 
data are presented as table 7.7. 
The combined productivity and wage trends explain the significant 
shift in relative costs against U.S. integrated producers. The trends are 
not  as dramatic for the European producers, but the Japanese have 
also surpassed them in productivity, and they are faced with the emer- 
gence of steel producers in the developing world that have hourly labor 
costs less than one-quarter of theirs. The wage data for 1984 are pre- 
sented in table 7.8. 
Exchange Rates 
Clearly, shifts in exchange rates over the last decade are very im- 
portant in  explaining changes in relative  competitiveness.  The real, 
multilateral  trade-weighted  value of the  U.S. dollar rose 50 percent 
from 1980 to 1984, although in the past year it has fallen significantly. 
Thus the relative position of  the United States has improved since the 
calculations underlying  tables  7.6 and  7.8 were  made.  The relative 182  David G.  Tarr 
Table 7.7  Hourly Compensation for Production Workers in the Steel Industry as 
Percentage of Hourly Compensation for Production Workers in 
Manufacturing in the Same Country 











































































































140.1  I 
120.21 
Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Hourly Compensation Costs for Production Workers in 
Manufacturing, 34 Countries, 1975- 1982.” 
improvement of the U.S. position is, however, less than the percentage 
decrease in the value of the U.S. dollar. Raw materials are purchased 
on world markets, usually in U.S. dollar-denominated amounts so that, 
for example, Japanese raw materials costs are lower after the appre- 
ciation of the yen against the dollar. Nonetheless, although the gap in 
relative costs between the United States and its competitors has not 
been eliminated, it has been considerably narr~wed.~ 
Mini-Mills 
The pessimistic comparisons of the U.S. steel industry’s  cost position 
with that of other countries does not extend to U.S. “mini-mills.” These 
are small, nonintegrated plants that recycle  scrap into certain rolled 
steel products such as bars and rods. Mini-mills often reap high profits 
from a combination of  modern technology, good location (in growing 
southern and western markets overlooked by the majors), and a work 
force unencumbered by restrictive work rules.  Since 1960, these op- 
erations have increased their share of U.S. steel production from about 
3 percent to 20 percent. Interestingly, some of  this ground was recap- 
tured market-share from imports. 
The mini-mills  are likely to make further inroads into the sales of 
the major domestic producers. If they succeed in developing continuous 
casters that allow them to produce flat-rolled products at a lower min- 
imum efficient size, the inroads could be dramatic.  lo This development 
may also be dependent on whether producers can turn direct reduction 




Country  Unit 
United States  Dollar 
Canada  Dollar 
Brazil  Cruzeiro 
Japan  Yen 




























National  U.S.  Index 






20.28  20.28  100 
19.86  15.34  76 
3090  1.67  8 
2599  10.95  54 
1670  2.07  10 
Austria  Shilling  20.00  78.87  94.1  153.09  7.65  38 
Belgium  Franc  57.75  358.53  94.6  697.70  12.08  60 
France  Franc  8.736  39.16  103.7  79.77  9.13  45 
Germany  Mark  2.845  16.34  83.4  29.97  10.53  52 
Italy  Lira  1756  8886  99.3  17710  10.09  50 
Netherlands  G  u  i I  d  e  r  3.208  19.73  84.1  36.32  11.32  56 
United Kingdom  Pound  ,7482  3.97  36.6  5.42  7.25  36 
Source: U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics, August 1985 (provisional estimates). 184  David G.  Tarr 
furnaces and thereby dramatically reduces scrap requirements) into an 
economically  viable option. Otherwise scrap prices  may be bid  up, 
cutting into the mini-mills’ profitability. 
The large integrated  producers, unfortunately, appear incapable of 
emulating the mini-mills.  Armco is closing its mini-mill  in  Houston, 
and Bethlehem is selling its two mini-mills in Los Angeles and Seattle. 
These companies are encumbered by their contracts with the United 
Steelworkers union; thus, they face higher wages and, possibly more 
important, more restrictive work rules. 
The mini-mills  in  the EC are also regarded as relatively  efficient 
producers that have  exerted competitive pressure on the integrated 
producers. The most notable examples are the “Bresciani,”  a group 
of about 80 steel producers near the city of Brescia in northern Italy.” 
7.3  Adjustment in the United States and the European Community 
7.3.1  The United States 
Recent Protection History 
The U.S. steel industry has enjoyed significant levels of trade pro- 
tection since 1969. To the extent that it has perceived a crisis, the U.S. 
government has responded with intermittent periods of trade protection. 
The first  major  action was the  “voluntary  restraint agreements” 
(VRAs) with the EC and Japan that were in effect from 1969 to 1974. 
Because of the worldwide boom in steel demand during 1973 and 1974, 
however, these restraints were not binding in these last two years.’* 
The next major episode of protection was the initiation of the trigger 
price mechanism (TPM) in 1978. The TPM was, in principle, designed 
to establish a minimum price for imports below which imports could 
not enter without being subjected to an expedited antidumping inves- 
tigation.  It has been estimated that the TPM induced an increase in 
import prices of approximately 9 percent (Crandall 1981).13 
In  1982 a major effort was undertaken by the majority of the inte- 
grated U.S. steel producers to obtain antidumping and countervailing 
duties on the products of the EC and a number of other countries. This 
effort led to  the signing of the VRA with the EC, which will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
In early  1984 the United  Steelworkers of America and Bethlehem 
Steel Corporation petitioned  the  United  States International Trade 
Commission  (ITC) for relief  from imports under section 201  of the 
Trade Act of 1974; this section allows exclusion of fairly traded imports 
if they are assessed to be a substantial cause of serious injury. Although 
the ITC recommended that quotas be imposed, the president rejected 185  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
formal quotas. Instead, he directed his trade representative to negotiate 
VRAs with virtually all major foreign suppliers of steel to the United 
States, in the hopes of reducing imports from about 25-26  percent to 
18.5 percent of domestic consumption excluding semifinished steel. 
Costs of the Existing Quotas 
Tarr and  Morkre  (1984) have estimated  the annual costs to U.S. 
consumers of the 18.5 percent quota to be  $1.1  billion in  1983 U.S. 
dollars. Of this, $779 million consists of inefficiency costs to the U.S. 
economy and the remainder constitutes a transfer from U.S. consumers 
to U.S. producers. The estimates also reveal that non-U.S. producers 
are expected to earn $557 million in quota rents compared with $428 
million in  additional profits for  U.S. producers.  Over the  five-year 
scheduled life of the VRAs, they are estimated to cost U.S consumers 
$4.8 billion and the economy $3.4 billion in present value terms. 
To obtain  some perspective  on the costs of  the quotas, Tarr and 
Morkre estimated the costs in terms of the number of jobs protected 
and earnings losses saved. The quota is expected to protect temporarily 
9,951 jobs. This means that the costs to consumers are $1 14 thousand 
per job per year, and the costs to the economy are $81 thousand per 
job per year. For every dollar of  earnings losses saved by otherwise 
displaced  steelworkers, consumers lose  $35 and  the economy loses 
$25. These estimates are summarized in tables 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11. 
Impact of the Quotas on Adjustment 
Each of  the three episodes of protection described above has been 
initiated by respective administrations with the hope that the industry 
would use the breathing room offered by the protection to modernize 
and become competitive with its foreign rivals.  Indeed, the current 
Table 7.9  Estimates of  Relevant Costs and Gains as a Result of  an  18.5 Percent 
Quota on  Carbon and Alloy Steel Products (excluding semi-finished)" 
Present Value 
of Costs over 
(base-yearb  dollars)  (1983 dollars)  (1983 dollars) 
Annual Costs  Annual Costs  Four Years 
Consumers' losses  1,131  1,098  3,981 
Losses to the U.S. economy  803  780  2,827 
Gains to U.S. producers  44  1  428  1,552 
Quota rents to foreigners  573  557  2,018 
Source: Tarr and Morkre (1984, 130). 
"In millions of dollars. 
bThe base year is September 1983 through August  1984. 186  David G.  Tarr 
Table 7.10  Annual Costs to Consumers and Inefficiency Costs to the United 
States Economy for Each Job Saved by  the Quota 
(in base-year" dollars) 
Losses to consumers  113,622 
Losses to the economy  80,682 
Source: Tarr and Morkre (1984, 130). 
'The  base year is September 1983 through August 1984. 
Table 7.11  Costs, Benefits, and Cost-Benefit Ratios for Each Dollar of 
Earnings Losses Saved by  the 18.5 Percent Quota 
Costs: Present Value  Benefits: 









Source: Tarr and Morkre (1984). 
"Figures shown as millions of base-year dollars, where the base year is September 1983 
through August 1984. 
protection was authorized by Congress through the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984, which included the requirement that continuation of the 
trade relief  in  any year is contingent on the major  steel producers' 
reinvesting substantially all of their net cash flow from steel operations 
into modernization of their steel operations.  l4 
As the trends in labor productivity would suggest, previous efforts 
in this regard have been unsuccessful. For example, there has not been 
a new integrated steel plant built in the United States since Bethlehem's 
Burns Harbor facility was constructed in 1962. Indeed, given the above 
international cost comparisons and trends in demand, it is not surprising 
to learn that calculations of the profitability of such investments (Cran- 
dall 1981) indicate that they are very unprofitable at current prices. 
More serious than the fact that the quota program is not likely to 
achieve its goal of promoting a modern, efficient U.S. steel industry, 
is the fact that protection may hurt the integrated  steel producers in 
the long run. The major problems of the U.S. integrated producers are 
their labor costs, the decline in demand, and the rise of  the mini-mills. 
How will protection affect each of  these areas? 
With protection in place it may become more difficult to obtain the 
further wage concessions and work rule modifications required to lower 
labor costs and make the integrated producers more competitive. This 
will exacerbate the integrated producers problems not only with inter- 187  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
national competition, once the quotas are removed, but also with the 
mini-mills. 
The industry has suffered a decline in demand in part because of a 
switch to alternative materials and in part because more steel is being 
brought into the country in the form of manufactured products. The 
amount of steel imported indirectly as  manufactured products rose from 
1.2 million tons in  1962 to 5.2 million tons in  1973. By causing U.S. 
prices to rise, the quotas will promote the use of alternative materials 
further and encourage research and development into new materials. 
Moreover, manufacturers of products that use steel will have a greater 
incentive to locate their plants out of the United States where they can 
benefit from the lower world  prices. Once investments are made in 
alternative technologies or production sites, it will be difficult for the 
U.S.  steel industry to win back these markets. Thus, rather than helping 
the industry in the long run, the protection can be expected to result 
in a less competitive integrated steel sector. 
7.3.2  The European Community 
Domestic  Controls 
A plan, which came to be known as the “Davignon”  plan (after the 
Commissioner of Industrial Affairs, Etienne Davignon), was instituted 
in the EC in May 1977. Besides import controls, it called for mandatory 
“minimum”  prices on reinforcing bars, a product under stiff compe- 
tition,  and also called for “reference”  or “guidance”  prices for six 
other steel products. The price restraints were combined with voluntary 
production quotas. 
This effort at a voluntary cartel proved unsuccessful when the market 
deteriorated in  1980. In response, a  “manifest crisis” was declared. 
The most important immediate consequence was the introduction on 
3 1  October 1980 of mandatory production quotas for producers of steel 
within the EC. When the market further deteriorated, mandatory min- 
imum prices were extended to other products besides the six products 
mentioned. Eventually, minimum prices were established for most strip 
products, cold-rolled sheet, some hot-rolled sheet, and heavy sections 
and beams. 
Finally, a code on national subsidies was adopted in August  1981. 
In principle,  subsidies were supposed to be tied to a program of ra- 
tionalization and restructuring of the steel industry. All national sub- 
sidies were to be terminated by the end of 1985. 
The most strenuous objections  to  the production quotas and minimum 
prices have come  from the most efficient producers,  the most notable ex- 
ample being the aforementioned “Bresciani.”  Being efficient mini-mills, 
they were very unhappy with the minimum prices for reinforcing rods 
which they contended deprived them of their competitive advantage. The 188  David G.  Tarr 
Bresciani proved to be a major enforcement problem for the Commis- 
sion since,  despite threats of major penalties, complaints kept coming  in 
of sales below the minimum price. Eventually, an agreement was reached 
whereby in return for compliance with the Commission’s price sched- 
ule, the Bresciani received, in effect, an export quota to other countries 
within the EC  (Lowenfeld 1979,299-300). 
The large German producers also objected to the production quotas. 
These producers are regarded as being the most efficient of the EC’s 
integrated producers, as well as having the greatest proportion of their 
plants at minimum efficient size.I5  The quotas had the effect of shifting 
production away from these firms that could produce at  the lowest cost. 
Import Protection 
In 1977 the EC also initiated an import control program, along with 
a gradually escalating program of EC controls on domestic production, 
prices, investment, and subsidies. The import control program employs 
a system of basic import prices. These basic prices are like the U.S. 
trigger-price mechanism; in principle they represent the cost of sup- 
plying steel to the EC from the world’s  low-cost  suppliers. Imports 
below these prices are deemed to be dumped without any prior inquiry 
into the question of injury (Lowenfeld 1979, 289).16 If a country ne- 
gotiates a VRA with the EC, however, it is then exempt from the basic 
import price system. Fifteen countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, South Africa, Australia, Brazil, South Korea, 
Japan, Spain, Norway, Finland, Austria, and Sweden), providing about 
75 percent of the EC’s imports, agreed to a VRA as of  1 January 1978, 
and these VRAs have  been renewed annually.  With  respect to the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, the VRAs were 
concluded rather amicably. In the cases of Hungary, Romania, Aus- 
tralia, Poland, and South Korea, VRAs were not concluded until de- 
finitive  antidumping  duties  were  threatened  (Jones  1986).  These 
countries agreed to a VRA because the basic prices were set so high 
that they would otherwise have been excluded from the market. 
The VRAs control both quantity and price. For non-EFTA countries, 
specific quantity limitations are mentioned in the agreements, whereas 
for EFTA countries, export amounts are merely required  to reflect 
traditional trade patterns. Imports are not permitted to be sold at less 
than the lowest delivered price to  a location, less a penetration margin. 
The penetration margin  is  3 percent for ordinary steel from EFTA 
producers and 6 percent from non-EFTA producers. In addition, the 
price must exceed the EC’s “minimum” or “guidance” prices, which- 
ever applies. 
The minimum-price restraints of the VRAs appear to be much more 
binding than the quantity restraints. Jondrow, Chase, and Gamble (1982) 
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domestic steel to be competitive. This is because there are greater costs 
associated with the purchase of imported steel due to factors such as 
higher inventory and warehousing costs and greater lag times in await- 
ing delivery. There is evidence, however, that the VRAs have achieved 
their intended effect of increasing the relative price of imports from 
countries subject to VRAs.I9 Thus, we find that Brazil and Korea, that 
are among the lowest cost producers in the world, are falling far short 
of  meeting their quotas. For example, South Korea shipped less than 
3  percent of its allowed  quota in  1984  (European Community Com- 
mission, 1986). The experience of the Bresciani suggests, however, that 
it is profitable for the most efficient producers to sell at prices less than 
the minimum prices. Thus, if  imports were permitted at lower prices, 
they would likely capture a larger share of the market. 
7.3.3  The US-EC Steel Arrangement 
An especially interesting episode, from the perspective of both US- 
EC trade relations and antidumping and countervailing duty law, began 
in early 1982. A massive antidumping and countervailing duty inves- 
tigation was launched by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) 
and the ITC, after complaints were filed by the major U.S. integrated 
steel producers. Initially 132 complaints, charging very substantial sub- 
sidization and dumping, were filed against producers from Belgium, 
France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom, as well as from Brazil, Romania, South Africa, and 
Spain. The DOC is charged with the determination of the subsidy or 
dumping margin, and the ITC is charged with the question of whether 
the industry is materially injured by virtue of the subsidized or  dumped 
imports. 
With respect to the EC, the DOC found a very diverse pattern of 
subsidies.  While  a number of  the EC producers  were found  to  be 
subsidized by substantial margins, a large portion of the EC capacity 
was determined to be unsubsidized or subsidized by only a small amount. 
The large  French producers,  Usinor and Sacilor, were found to be 
subsidized at between 11 and 21 percent; the Italian firm, Italsider, was 
found to be subsidized at 26 percent; the Belgian firm, Cockerill-Sambre, 
was found to be subsidized at a rate of 13 percent; and the British Steel 
Corporation was found to be subsidized  at a rate of 20  percent.  In 
contrast, seven of the eight large German firms were found to be un- 
subsidized and the eighth was found to  be subsidized at only 1 percent.2" 
The large Dutch firm of Estel Hoogovens, 13 small British firms, and 
the Belgian firm of  Clabecq were also found to be unsubsidized; in 
addition, the Luxembourg firms of Arbed and MMR-A were found to 
be subsidized at the low rates of 0.5 percent and 1.5 percent, respec- 
tively.  A complete list  of the DOC determinations in these cases is 
found in table 7. I 2.2' Table 7.12  Summary of Final Subsidy Ratesa Found by  the U.S. DOC on 
24 August 1982 
Country  Producer  Product(s)  Subsidy Rate 
Belgium  Cockerill- 
Sambre 







Federal  AG de Dillinger 























A.F.L.  Falck 




Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Plate 
Plate 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Plate 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Plate 
Structurals 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Plate 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Structurals 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Structurals 
Plate 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Structurals 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Structurals 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet & strip 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 

































1 I .300% 
17.980% 




17.8  10% 
0.539% 
1.523% Table 7.12 
(continued) 
Country  Producer 












































Product(s)  Subsidy Rate 
Hot-rolled sheet & strip 
Cold-rolled sheet 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Structurals 
Plate 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Structurals 
Structurals 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Structurals 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Hot-rolled carbon steel bar 
Cold-formed carbon steel bar 





























Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Press Release, 25  August  1982. 
"This table shows the rates of subsidy (as a percentage of f.0.b.  value) found in the DOC'S 
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This diverse pattern of subsidy determinations by the DOC proved 
very troublesome on both sides of the Atlantic and set the stage for a 
negotiated settlement. From the perspective of U.S. producers, coun- 
tervailing duties in an amount equal to the subsidy margins and limited 
to those producers who were found to be subsidized would not accom- 
plish very much in the way of protection. The four nations from which 
the  United  States imports the most  steel are Japan, Canada,  West 
Germany, and South Korea. There were no cases brought against Japan 
or Canada; West Germany was exonerated by the DOC proceedings; 
and South Korea in subsequent proceedings would have only negligible 
duties assessed against it. Even if the duties were implemented against 
the EC producers found to be subsidized, other unsubsidized producers 
in the EC or elsewhere could take their place. 
From the perspective of  the EC, firms such as Usinor, Sacilor, the 
British Steel Corporation, Italsider, and Cockerill-Sambre were quite 
concerned that the United States might actually apply rates of  coun- 
tervailing duties that would probably exclude them from the U.S. mar- 
ket. In contrast, EC member states who were found not to be subsidized 
resisted an agreement negotiated by the EC that would restrain their 
exports to the U.S. The German firms, in particular, were well known 
for their  long-standing opposition to subsidies to steel producers in 
other EC member countries with which they had to compete. They 
saw their access to the U.S. market being limited because  of  these 
subsidies. The Commission, however, wanted a solution that would 
“share the burden”  among member states. Ultimately, on 21  October 
1982, as the deadline for a negotiated  settlement neared, the German 
producers agreed to go along with a VRA for the EC as a whole, when 
pipe and tube products (a product line in which the Germans were the 
largest suppliers) were deleted from the explicit agreement.22  The U .S. 
Customs Service was charged with monitoring the agreement through 
a system of  export licensing tied to projected apparent consumption 
in  the U.S. Once again, as with the efforts to enforce the cartel do- 
mestically,  the  Commission’s cartel or burden-sharing approach  re- 
sulted in less output going to the most efficient European producers. 
7.4  Policy Conclusions 
7.4.1  Impact of  Domestic Policies 
The main difference in the policy response of the United States and 
the EC has been in the domestic area. The U.S. government has not 
intervened directly in the domestic market. It has permitted the large 
losses suffered by its domestic firms to be the market guide for plant 
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capacity of the integrated producers (almost 25 percent in the last eight 
years) and, at the same time, in significant additions to capacity in the 
efficient mini-mill sector. This trend is likely to continue. 
The EC, in contrast, has administered an elaborate domestic cartel. 
It first imposed production quotas and minimum prices  and in  later 
years attempted to restrain subsidies and investment as well as reduce 
capacity. How well has this program worked in bringing about adjust- 
ment in the EC compared to the market-oriented adjustments in the 
U.S.?  Although reliable capacity estimates are difficult to obtain, the 
estimates of table 7.1, as well as others that are available,23 indicate 
that EC capacity reductions have been considerably less than those in 
the U.S. In this fundamental regard, the EC program has not been as 
successful as that of the U.S.24 
One must also recognize that the production quotas, minimum prices, 
and “burden sharing” have tended to shift production  to the less ef- 
ficient producers in the EC, enabling them to stay in business longer 
than in the absence of assigned production quotas and the higher cartel 
prices. This causes the efficient producers to  earn lower profits or  incur 
greater  losses, thereby discouraging them from making the limited kinds 
of investments necessary for long-run survival. U.S. and EC integrated 
producers have been able to compete effectively in markets for higher- 
quality  products, and because of technological  progress in finishing 
mills, limited investments will be necessary by these producers to con- 
tinue to compete successfully  in  these markets. Thus, if  production 
quotas were the only aspect of the Commission’s program, it should 
clearly be regarded as counterproductive. 
The Commission’s program, however,  also included limitations on 
the use of subsidies by the national governments. Subsidies were to 
be granted only as part of a rationalization or restructuring effort and 
were to be eliminated entirely by the end of  1985. Without restraints 
on subsidies  many  of the adverse effects of the cartel effort would 
have been worse, since subsidies to inefficient producers prolong their 
existence, drive down prices, and, thereby, discourage investment by 
efficient producers.25 Thus, the Commission should be commended for 
its effort to  reduce the subsidies. The problem is in assessing the extent 
to which  the Commission was responsible for the reduced subsidies. 
Because of budgetary constraints, the national governments might have 
reduced the subsidies in any event.2h  Given the political difficulties of 
reducing subsidies, however, pressure from the Commission may have 
helped this effort. 
7.4.2 
This paper has explained  that in the last  10  to 12  years there has 
been a fundamental shift in the international steel industry. The indus- 
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trialized  countries  have  seen a decrease in  their demand  while the 
developing countries have seen an increase in demand. Observers ex- 
pect this pattern  to continue through the next  15 years.  Also during 
the last  10 to 12 years, some key developing countries have become 
the world’s low-cost producers and have captured market shares from 
the EC in third markets. Finally the established integrated producers 
in the United States have been losing market shares to mini-mills within 
their own country. 
In response to significant dislocations of labor and reduced profits 
and capital losses, the United States and the EC have acted to protect 
their markets through nontariff barriers. The estimates provided in this 
paper document the expected result that the resource misallocation and 
rent transfer effects of these nontariff barriers considerably exceed the 
saved adjustment costs. This paper has also argued that protection may 
aggravate  the causes of  the  injury  to the  industry  in  the long run. 
Protection simply cannot solve the problem of declining domestic de- 
mand and loss of competitiveness in third markets. By increasing the 
cost of  steel to domestic consumers of  steel, protection  will  in fact 
accelerate the  shift to alternative  materials  and to sites outside the 
protected regions by manufacturers of  products for which steel is an 
important input. Moreover, especially in the United States, it is likely 
to slow the cost-reducing effort of those firms that have the potential 
for surviving in the long run. 
7.4.3  Future Policy Choices 
Regarding domestic policy in  the future, the above assessment of 
the effects of recent Commission policy clearly indicates that the Com- 
mission would contribute to a more viable, efficient steel industry in 
the  EC by  eliminating its  domestic controls  on  prices,  output, and 
investment as soon as possible.  These controls become more costly 
and create more distortions over time, since companies who need to 
shift their products  lines are impeded from doing so because of  the 
lack of quota. The Commission’s efforts at eliminating subsidies, how- 
ever, will, if  effective, help produce a more efficient and viable steel 
industry in the EC. 
Regarding the protectionist external policies of the U.S. and the EC, 
their continuation will impose significant costs on their economies and 
consumers each year they are in place. Moreover, the longer they are 
in place, the less likely their industries are to be competitive in the 
long run. Thus, a policy of eliminating, as soon as possible, the nontariff 
barriers to trade erected by the United States and the EC will result 
in the lowest costs to the economies involved as well as more efficient 
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Notes 
1. Profits in  1974 for the U.S. steel firms were $2.5 billion. In 1982,  1983, 
and  1984, however,  these companies lost $3.4 billion,  $2.2 billion,  and $0.2 
billion, respectively, on their steel operations (American Iron and Steel Insti- 
tute, Annual Statistical Report, 1984). 
2. A very influential document in this regard was Projection 8.5  by the In- 
ternational Iron and Steel Institute. 
3. Prior to the experience of the last decade, the curve was thought merely 
to increase at a decreasing rate throughout, without actually achieving a max- 
imum and then declining. That is, ify  equals per capita income, andfi) equals 
per capita consumption of steel, then it was previously believed that fb)  > 
0 and f‘b)  < 0 for all  y. The data of the last decade, however, appear to 
contradict the hypothesis that per capita consumption of steel is monotonically 
increasing in per capita income. Thus, while it is still believed that per capita 
consumption of steel increases at a decreasing rate with per capita income, 
i.e., f”b)  < 0 (for levels of y that we have observed), there appears to be a 
level of income, yo, that varies across nations after which f decreases, i.e., 
fb)  < 0 for y > yo. 
4. Slow rates of growth in the economies as a whole clearly contributed to 
the decline in  demand for steel in  the industrial countries. If  lower energy 
prices are here to stay, this may stimulate economy-wide growth, which will 
give an impetus to steel demand. 
5. This should not be construed as an argument for subsidies for steel de- 
velopment. Rather, it suggests that, in the long run, market opportunities may 
present themselves. 
6. For a similar view, see Crandall (1986). 
7. Unpublished data  obtained from the Office of Productivity and Technology, 
8. See Tarr (198Sa) for an explanation of why this occurred. 
9. See Bradford (1986) for some up-to-date cost comparisons. 
10. The minimum efficient size for producing flat-rolled products is currently 
over 3 million tons per year, whereas mini-mills  typically produce about one- 
half of a million tons per year. See Tarr (1984) for a discussion of the minimum 
efficient size steel plant. 
11.  Contrary to what  some authors have  claimed,  I  do not believe  that 
inefficient management decisions regarding technology adoption have been the 
cause of the relative decline of the integrated U.S. steel producers (Tarr 198Sb). 
12. For an analysis of the effects of the VRAs see Jondrow (1978) or  Crandall 
(1981). 
13. See my analysis in the FTC staff steel report (1977) for the distributional 
and efficiency consequences of the TPM, and see Barnett and Schorsch (1983, 
239-42)  for an evaluation of the TPM’s role in the public policy debate on 
steel. 
14. Since most firms are already exceeding this requirement, it is not con- 
sidered an onerous restraint. See New York Times, IS Oct. 1984, pp. D1,  D6. 
IS. See Tarr (1984) for an explanation of the minimum efficient size steel 
plant. 
16. Provision  was made for normal  value, for the purpose of a dumping 
investigation,  to be determined by the usual Commission standards, if  that 
would produce a significantly different result. See Official Journal of the Eu- 
ropean Communities (1984). 
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17. The VRAs with Bulgaria and Brazil were initiated in 1979. Tsoukalis and 
Strauss (1985,  217) argue that countries agreed to VRAs because otherwise 
they would  have  been excluded from the market. In view  of  the provision 
mentioned in the previous note, however, it may have been only that the basic 
price system allowed the antidumping authorities greater harassment power. 
18. The EC  has maintained since the 1950s an elaborate system of delivered 
list prices, known as the prix de base. All producers must publish their basing 
point and prices, including extra charges. From this, a delivered price to any 
point in the EC can be calculated for any producer. A  seller is permitted to 
sell below his own list price if he is matching a competitor’s list price, a practice 
known as alignment.  In the case of a competitor within  the EC, alignment 
would  be based on the list price, but  historically,  alignment  has also been 
allowed on imported products. Alignment privileges were suspended for im- 
ports from countries with a VRA and, therefore, who had a penetration margin 
in  effect. An in-depth  study of  the effects of the prix de base system is  in 
Stegemann (1977). 
19. Let p  equal a ratio defined as the average unit value of imports into the 
EC from countries subject to a VRA divided by the average unit value of intra- 
EC trade. This ratio has risen from .94 in 1977 to 1.01 in 1984. These  calculations 
were performed by  Andrzej Olechowski as background for the Finger and 
Olechowski (1986) paper.  Moreover, Messerlin (1986) reports estimates that 
the Davignon plan had the effect of raising prices in the EC. 
20. We characterize the situation as unsubsidized when the DOC finding is 
that the rate of subsidy is too small to assess a countervailing duty. In fact, 
the subsidy rates for these German producers ranged from 0.015  percent to 
0.15 percent, a situation characterized by the DOC as “de minimus.” 
21. For comments on  the appropriate methodology that the DOC should have 
employed in these cases, see my analysis in the Federal Trade Commission’s 
Bureaus’ Comments (1982).  For an evaluation of whether the DOC did in fact 
follow these principles, see Mueller and van der Ven (1982) and the reply by 
Horlick (1983). 
Prior to the DOC estimate of subsidies, the only systematic effort to estimate 
subsidies in the steel industry was by my coauthors in my FTC Staff Report 
(1977). We found that subsidies were too small to affect trade flows with the 
possible exception of that to the British Steel Corporation, which was subsi- 
dized at a rate of about 3 percent. Since the publication of our report, however, 
a number of European governments have made large infusions of capital into 
some of their steel firms. These infusions have often taken the form of equity 
acquisitions  by the government at a price for the equity that exceeded the 
market value. It is generally true that the DOC found little or no subsidization 
unless such a capital infusion was present. 
Mutti (1984) has also estimated the rate of  subsidies to the EC producers 
and has come to similar conclusions on the importance of these large capital 
infusions in the subsidy calculations.  Still another estimate of the subsidies is 
by Lamm in Les Echos, 22 Nov. 1984. 
22. There was a nonbinding agreement by EC  producers to limit their exports 
of pipe and tube to the U.S. market, but since there was no mechanism to 
enforce the restraint, competition among EC producers for customers resulted 
in the agreement being violated. This is a standard cartel problem. See Jones 
(1986) for a discussion  of this point and Benyon and Bourgeois (1984) for  further 
details of the overall agreement. 
23. See Peter Marcus and Karlos Kirsis (1984) for  additional capacity estimates. 197  The Steel Crisis in the U.S. and EC 
24. The data of table 7.1 reveal that overall capacity reductions in the EC 
have been comparable to those in the U.S. since 1980. Since the decline in 
demand began in 1974, however, 1974 is the appropriate base year with which 
to make comparisons of capacity reductions. Moreover, the overall U.S.  ca- 
pacity figures underestimate the reduction in integrated mill capacity because 
they include the increased capacity of the efficient mini-mill sector. See Cran- 
dall (1986) for a similar view of US-EC relative capacity reduction. 
25. See Mutti (1984) for a formal derivaton of this result and estimation of 
the effects of the subsidies on the unsubsidized German and U.S. producers. 
26. See Messerlin (1983 and 1986) for a similar view. 
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